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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase stated more than 100 years ago that
“[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States.”1
This observation
describes the essential feature of our ongoing experiment with
federalism. “Our Federalism”2 represents a “system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments.”3 As Justice Black cautioned, however, federalism does
not mean “blind deference to ‘State’s Rights’ any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our National
Government and its courts.”4 Much of our constitutional history has
∗
Dean and Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. I want to thank
my research assistant, Matthew Agen, for his help on this Article.
1. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869).
2. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). In Younger, Justice Black noted
that the “slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early struggling days of our Union of
State, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.” Id.
3. Id. at 44 (holding that a plaintiff in an action challenging the
constitutionality of California’s Criminal Syndication Act was not entitled to relief in
federal court because of pending state court issues involving the Act).
4. Id.
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involved attempts to allocate power between the two indestructible
units and to find appropriate ways to accord sensitivity to the
legitimate state and federal interests.5
One aspect of our federalism focuses on the distribution of power
between state and federal courts. During the past two decades, the
Supreme Court has articulated federalism concerns to restrict a
person’s ability to sue a state in federal court for federal rights
violations. In an attempt to strike a balance between state and federal
power, the Court sided with the states. Relying in some instances on
general federalism concerns6 and in others7 on the Eleventh
Amendment,8 the Court effectively closed the federal courthouse
doors to many lawsuits alleging state violations of the Constitution or
federal statutes.
This past term, the Supreme Court championed states’ rights in a
manner that extended federalism notions well beyond existing
boundaries. In Alden v. Maine,9 for the first time in our history a
Court majority held that the Constitution is not limited to protecting
states from lawsuits in federal court. Rather, the Constitution
embodies a much broader principle of sovereign immunity that
protects states from suits brought in their own state courts.10 Alden
and other recent cases11 limiting congressional authority to abrogate a
5. See DAAN BRAVEMAN, PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS: A ROLE FOR
FEDERAL COURTS 11 (1989) (“We have a dual system of government, and one of the
fundamental issues in our development has been, and continues to be, the
relationship between the two indestructible components of that system. Indeed
much of our constitutional history has involved a struggle to find a proper
distribution of power between the states and the central government.”).
6. See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Younger doctrine
and its development to close federal courts to lawsuits that challenge state conduct).
7. See infra notes 95-195 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the
Eleventh Amendment to dismantle the federal courts as guardians of federal rights).
8. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
9. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
10. See id. at 2260-61 (noting that “nothing . . . in any other part of the
Constitution suggested the states could not assert immunity from private suit in their
own courts”).
11. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction in suits
where an individual wishes to sue a state because of Congress’ failure to effectively
abrogate state sovereign immunity or to obtain a state waiver of sovereign immunity);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199 (1999) (holding that Congress could not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity
through the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress does not have
the authority to subject a state to the jurisdiction of a federal court if an individual
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state’s immunity from suit seriously erode an individual’s ability to
enforce federal rights against a state. Indeed, the Court’s current
approach to sovereign immunity creates an “enforcement gap”12 in
federal law and converts federalism into a one-way protection for
states that disregards the federal government’s interests.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the impact of the latest
federalism developments on the judicial enforcement of federal
rights.13 To illustrate the shift that occurred in this past term, this
Article first will review the Court’s reliance on federalism to restrict
the role of the federal courts “to adjudicate claims alleging state
violations of federal rights.”14 Regardless of the propriety of such
reliance, it is evident that the Court’s decisions assumed that state
courts would be available to protect federal interests. Second, this
Article analyzes Alden and examines its implications for enforcing
federal rights and maintaining an appropriate balance between state
and federal concerns.15 This Article concludes that by constraining
the ability of any court to ensure that states follow federal law, the
Court largely has disregarded the necessity for sensitivity to both state
asserts a federal right).
12. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that “a
Congress that includes the State not only within its substantive regulatory rules but
also (expressly) within a related system of private remedies” avoids an “enforcement
gap” and gives Congress considerable power to regulate private conduct).
13. This Article focuses on the use of federalism to limit the role of the courts in
enforcing federal laws against the states. Recently, the Court also has relied on
federalism to limit congressional power to impose requirements on state legislative
and executive bodies. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997) (holding
that the obligation of state officers to perform handgun background checks was an
unconstitutional imposition on state officials to execute the federal law); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (holding that a federal law requiring states to
accept and to regulate nuclear waste according to congressional instruction falls
outside of Congress’ enumerated powers). The Court will continue to examine
federalism limits on congressional power to direct the operations of a state’s
legislative or executive branches. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999)
(deciding whether Congress has power to enact the Violence Against Women Act).
In Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000), the Court held that the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994), does not violate the Tenth
Amendment by restricting the state’s ability to disclose information in motor vehicle
department records. The Court distinguished Printz and New York in the following
way:
[T]he DPPA does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to
regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the states as the owners of
databases. It does not require the South Carolina legislature to enact any
laws or regulations and it does not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.
Id. at 672.
14. See infra Part I (discussing the role of federal courts, particularly in the
context of Younger and the Eleventh Amendment).
15. See infra Part I (discussing Alden and its role in maintaining a balance between
state and federal interests).
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and federal interests, a concept that lies at the heart of federalism.16
I.

LIMITING THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS17

In recent years, the Court created two paths by which it diminished
the power of federal courts to prevent states from encroaching on
federal rights. One approach relied on a federal court’s equitable
powers and comity principles,18 while the other depended specifically
on the Eleventh Amendment.19 These separate paths shared a
common theme: the Court’s preservation of federalism.
The focus of this Article is not to review in depth the historical
events leading to the emergence of the federal courts as protectors of
federal rights.
Instead, this Article shall concentrate on the
developments over the past two decades, specifically the use of
federalism, to immunize states from liability when they violate federal
law. Nevertheless, to appreciate these more recent developments,
some background is necessary.
Although our federal structure includes dual judicial systems, the
roles of the state and federal courts in protecting federal rights never
have been precise. In fact, the courts’ roles have been the subject of
ongoing controversy.20 Interestingly, at the Constitutional
Convention, the Founding Fathers devoted far more attention to the
structure and function of the legislative and executive branches than
the judicial branch.21 The total time spent discussing the creation of
the federal judiciary fit into one afternoon.22 Proponents of a
national judiciary feared that state courts could not be trusted to
enforce federal law.23 They argued that federal courts were needed to
ensure the supremacy and uniform application of federal law.24 The
16. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text (concluding that the Court has
not appropriately or adequately balanced state or federal interest).
17. For a more detailed discussion of the issues in this section, see BRAVEMAN,
supra note 5, which discusses the closing of federal courts to individuals who wish to
challenge the conduct of state and local officials.
18. See infra Part I.A (reviewing the Younger doctrine).
19. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Eleventh Amendment and the federal courts’
role in protecting federal rights).
20. See generally BRAVEMAN, supra note 5 (discussing the historical controversy
between state and federal courts to protect rights).
21. See F. BARASH, THE FOUNDING 161 (1987).
22. See id. at 162.
23. See 4 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 137 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987) (“[T]he Courts of the States can not be trusted with the administration of
the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often place the General
and local policy at variance.”) (statement of Mr. Ghorum).
24. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 230-32 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy Fairfield
ed., 1981) (discussing that life tenure, among other characteristics of the federal
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states’ rights advocates urged that a national judiciary would diminish
state authority.25 They expressed particular concern about the
possibility of lower federal court judges dispersed around the
country.26 Pierce Butler of South Carolina observed that “[t]he states
will revolt at such an encroachment.”27
The Constitutional Convention did not address the specific issue of
whether states could be subject to suit in federal court.28
Nevertheless, the issue was certainly on the minds of the Framers.
“The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant
and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of
deep apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution . . . .”29
To resolve the controversy regarding the creation of a national
judiciary, the Convention adopted two related compromise
provisions. First, Madison proposed a compromise30 that became
Article III. The Constitution would provide for one Supreme Court
and would authorize Congress to decide in the future on the creation
of lower federal courts.31 The second compromise involved the
authority to declare state laws unconstitutional. The delegates
rejected Madison’s proposal that Congress be authorized to veto state
laws.32 Instead, the delegates adopted Luther Martin’s compromise33
judiciary, will provide supremacy and uniformity in the application of the law); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 236-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy Fairfield ed., 1989)
(discussing in a letter written to the people of the State of New York the instances in
which a federal judiciary would have authority over a particular matter).
25. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 127-28 (Max
Farrand rev. ed., 1966) (discussing the establishment of the federal judiciary and the
implications for states’ rights).
26. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 50 (1964)
(examining the Constitutional Convention debate over the role of inferior courts).
27. FARRAND, supra note 25, at 125.
28. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 661 n.9 (1974) (discussing the
Constitutional Convention debate over the right of the federal judiciary to adjudicate
a state’s legal rights and liabilities).
29. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1922);
see also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-25 (1934) (discussing whether the
Framers intended the Constitution to allow for a state to surrender its immunity
when a suit is brought against it).
30. See generally Michael Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the
Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 42 (accounting “for the Court’s
reluctance to embrace fully a Supremacy Clause argument that would compel state
courts to provide a forum for the disposition of all federal judicial business . . .”).
31. See FARRAND, supra note 25, at 227 (resolving to establish a federal judiciary to
consist of “One Supreme tribunal”); JENSEN, supra note 26, at 50-51 (noting that the
passage of the Virginia plan included a provision to establish inferior courts).
32. See FARRAND, supra note 25, at 229 (resolving that Congress may only veto laws
that invoke or interfere with federal laws).
33. See JENSEN, supra note 26, at 67-68 (noting that Martin’s proposal rested on
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that became the Supremacy Clause,34 which bound state judges to
follow federal law.
These compromises, of course, did not resolve the controversies
over the role of the federal judiciary in enforcing federal law against
the states. They postponed the resolution for another day, or
perhaps more properly, for many future days. One of those days
arrived when the First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789,35
representing another compromise between the federalists and
antifederalists. The Act established a lower federal court system and
authorized the Supreme Court to review decisions by the highest
state courts that ruled against a federal claim.36
The antifederalists attacked the Act, describing it as a “vile law
system, . . . with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the
Federal Courts. The Constitution is meant to swallow all the State
constitutions, by degrees, and to swallow, by degrees, all the State
Judiciaries.”37 Virginia Senator William Grayson was more direct
when he characterized the Act as “monstrous.”38
From the
perspective of the states’ rightists, his description was a bit overstated,
at least with respect to the power of the lower federal courts to
entertain claims arising under federal law. The antifederalists had
succeeded in keeping such claims out of the federal courts. The Act
provided that challenges involving the Constitution or federal law
would be initiated in state courts and enter the federal system only
through Supreme Court review under Section 25.39
the premise that acts of Congress and U.S. treaties were binding on state courts).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
35. Judiciary Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 73.
36. The constitutionality of Section 25, which permitted Supreme Court review
of state court decisions, was upheld in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816). In response to Virginia’s arguments that such review intrudes on its
sovereignty, Justice Story observed that the Constitution “is crowded with provisions
which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest branches
of their prerogatives.” See id. at 343. Moreover, he commented on the importance of
Supreme Court review:
If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant
judgments [by the states], and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the
treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in
different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same
construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.
Id. at 347-48.
37. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 109 (1924) (quoting Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay’s notes
pertaining to the passage of the Judiciary Act).
38. See id. at 52 (“Senator William Grayson of Virginia wrote, immediately after its
passage, that it was ‘monstrous,’ that the states would take alarm, and that its
destruction might be predicted.”).
39. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
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This structure remained in place, with minor modifications,40 until
well after the Civil War. During the interim period, the Supreme
Court strengthened its own role as guardian of federal rights. The
decisions in Marbury v. Madison,41 Cohens v. Virginia,42 and Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee43 secured the Court’s authority to review state court
judgments and ensure the supremacy and uniform application of the
Constitution and federal laws. These decisions, however, neither
increased the power of the lower federal courts nor altered the
reliance on state courts in the first instance as protectors of federal
rights.
The lower federal courts’ transformation into guardians of federal
law was a slow process that began during the Reconstruction Period.
Relying on the new source of power contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress passed a series of Civil Rights statutes and
authorized lower federal courts to enforce the provisions.44 Among
these provisions was the predecessor of section 1983,45 which
authorized damages and injunctive relief against persons who acted
under color of state law to deprive others of federal rights.46 The
Court subsequently described section 1983 as “an important part of
the basic alteration in our federal system.”47 The Court noted that
the statute was designed to open “federal courts to private citizens,
40. For example, in 1815 Congress provided for removal from state to federal
courts of suits against federal officers attempting to collect war revenues. See
Revenue Act of February 4, 1815, 3 Stat. 195. It subsequently authorized removal of
other suits against federal officers. See generally Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 508-09
(1928) (describing, among other acts, the Act of February 4, 1815, as an example of
a “specific and temporary protection of [a] federal claim[] through the national
courts”).
41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (determining that the question of whether a
right has been vested is a question for the judicial branch).
42. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (determining that the Supreme Court must
preserve the intent and meaning of the Constitution).
43. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (ruling that the Supreme Court may review
any final state court judgment involving federal statutes, treaties, or the
Constitution).
44. See Civil Rights Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 3, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (providing
that the U.S. district and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction over all violations of
terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1875); Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. XXII, § 1, 17 Stat.
13 (providing for enforcement of certain provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
including the ability of citizens to bring an action against person who act under the
color of state law); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. CXIV, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (reenacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that provides for the protection of the civil
rights of the United States citizenry).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (authorizing constitutional damage claims against
state and local government officials).
46. See id.
47. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972).
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offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the
claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the Nation.”48
As part of the transformation process, Congress also enacted the
Judiciary Act of 1875,49 which included a general grant of federal
question jurisdiction. This Act
gave the federal courts the vast range of power that had lain
dormant in the Constitution since 1789. These courts ceased to be
restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different
states and became the primary and powerful reliances for
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and
50
treaties of the United States.

The Reconstruction Period, therefore, provided the potential for a
radical transformation of the legal structure that enforced federal
rights. This new structure altered the balance of federalism and
recognized the federal interest in preserving federal rights. As Justice
Blackmun observed:
“Taken collectively, the Reconstruction
Amendments, the Civil Rights Acts, and these new jurisdictional
statutes, all emerging from the caldron of the War Between the
States, marked a revolutionary shift in the relationship among
individuals, the States, and the Federal Government.”51
The
revolution, however, did not occur immediately; rather, it took
several decades to become a reality.52
Two decisions in the early twentieth century strengthened the role
of the lower federal courts in protecting citizens from state action. In

48. Id. at 239.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). See generally William Wiecek, The Reconstruction of
Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969) (describing the
expansion of federal court jurisdiction between 1863-1875).
50. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65
(1927).
51. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985).
52. The Supreme Court played a significant role in delaying the legal order
envisioned by the Reconstruction amendments and laws. See Slaughterhouse Cases,
83 U.S. 36 (1872) (refusing to invalidate state zoning restrictions in Louisiana); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding unconstitutional the Civil Rights Acts of
1875); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Louisiana public accommodations statute providing for the separation of black and
white train passengers); see also JOHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED
STATES 53-57 (1987) (reviewing the political maneuvering that fueled the growth of
federal judicial power). See generally HAROLD HYMAN & WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW 473-79 (1982) (outlining the history of federal usurpation of
states’ rights); Blackmun, supra note 51, at 11 (asserting that the Supreme Court
joined the other branches of the federal government in creating “our Dark Ages of
Civil Rights”).
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Ex parte Young,53 the Supreme Court held that a federal district court
could enjoin a state official attempting to enforce an unconstitutional
state law.54 Justice Harlan, in his dissent, noted the significance that
the decision would have on federalism when he wrote that the
decision “would inaugurate a new era . . . in the relations of the
National and state governments.”55 In the second decision, Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,56 the Court further enhanced
the power of the lower federal courts when it made clear that an
injunction could be used to enjoin unconstitutional state conduct
even when the misconduct also violated state law.57
Perhaps the most significant breakthrough in the transformation
process occurred in Brown v. Board of Education.58 In striking down
state segregation, the Supreme Court dramatically altered the
relations between the states and the national government, and made
the federal courts the primary guardians of federal rights.59 In the
years following Brown, the lower federal courts became the litigation
forum for state school segregation cases, as well as actions
challenging a wide range of other state activities, including zoning,
reapportionment, police misconduct, and prison conditions.60
Notably, Brown was not decided in isolation but rather at a time
when the world outside the courtroom was changing dramatically.
The other branches of the federal government had a national and
international agenda, which included the expansion of federal rights
and a federal interest in protecting those rights from state
deprivation.61
“A new spirit of nationalism”62 replaced the
53. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
54. See id. at 167.
55. Id. at 175.
56. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
57. See id. at 283 (holding that federal courts need not wait for final state
adjudication in cases implicating state and constitutional liberties).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. See id. at 490 (ordering the end of state-mandated racial segregation in public
education).
60. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1295 (1976) (reviewing the public function served by litigation with
regard to “how a government policy or program shall be carried out”). See generally
OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (providing a historical look at the
injunction as a remedy and the prominence of its use in the twentieth century as a
way of impeding organized labor and labor strikes).
61. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (stating that Brown was,
in part, the result of “those whites in policy making positions able to see the
economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow
abandonment of segregation”).
62. John J. Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (1978).
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isolationism of the turn of the century and, as Judge Gibbons stated:
“In the global village, deference to local solutions for problems that
transcend local interests is a quaint anachronism.”63 By the 1960s, the
structure envisioned during Reconstruction was firmly established.
Individuals had federal rights, federal remedies, and a federal forum
to challenge state conduct that violated federal law.
A. Younger Doctrine
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing over the next two decades,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts dismantled the legal structure
described above, swinging the federalism pendulum back in the
direction of states’ rights. To deconstruct the federalist structure, the
Court used the comity principle described in Younger v. Harris.64 John
Harris, a criminal defendant in California state court, filed a lawsuit
in federal court seeking to enjoin the state criminal proceeding on
the ground that the prosecution violated his First Amendment rights.
The federal district court agreed that the state law authorizing the
prosecution was unconstitutional and enjoined the district attorney
from proceeding with the state criminal case.65 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a federal district court should
not enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution except in
extraordinary circumstances.66
The Court based its noninterference policy, in part, on traditional
equitable principles. First, a court should not award injunctive relief
where there is an adequate remedy at law.67 Second, injunctive relief
is available only if the party can establish irreparable harm.68 The
63. Id. at 1119.
64. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
65. See Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 516 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (holding that
the “application of present and more enlightened concepts of the meaning of the
First Amendment requires the holding that the Act is unconstitutional on its face”).
66. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 (“[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the
District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California
statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal
courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances.”).
67. See id. at 43-44 (noting that “the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence
[provides] that courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief”). Younger actually was a misapplication of this equity principle. “An ‘adequate
remedy at law,’ as a bar to equitable relief in the federal courts, refers to a remedy on
the law side of the federal courts.” Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Southern Ry. Co.,
341 U.S. 341, 359 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
68. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (“In all of these cases the Court stressed the
importance of showing irreparable injury, the traditional prerequisite to obtaining
an injunction. In addition, however, the Court also made clear that . . . even
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Court held that injunctive relief was not appropriate because Harris
could challenge the constitutionality of the state law as a defense to
the state prosecution and, thus, had an adequate remedy at law.69
The Court, however, did not rely merely on equity rules, but
instead invoked notions of federalism and comity. The ruling stated
that “comity” encompasses a “recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.”70 The Court concluded
that out of respect for state courts a federal district court should not
enjoin a pending criminal proceeding.71 Younger, therefore, involved
the application of principles of federalism in a context where
equitable relief was sought in federal court to restrain a pending state
criminal proceeding.
Subsequently, the Court extended Younger in two significant ways to
close federal courts to suits challenging state conduct. In a series of
cases,72 the Court applied Younger in a civil, rather than criminal,
context. In Trainor v. Hernandez,73 for example, a federal court
enjoined state officials from unconstitutionally attaching the property
of welfare recipients as part of a state civil action to recover
fraudulently obtained welfare benefits. The district court held that
Younger and its comity principle did not apply because the pending
state proceeding was neither criminal nor quasi-criminal.74 The
Supreme Court rejected such a narrow reading of Younger and held
that the noninterference policy is applicable to state civil
proceedings.75 The Court cited the following factors: (1) the state
irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is ‘both great and immediate.’”) (quoting
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
69. See id. at 54 (holding that “the possible unconstitutionality of a statute ‘on its
face’ does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce
it . . .”).
70. Id. at 44.
71. See id. at 53 (reaffirming “the settled doctrines that have always confined very
narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions”).
72. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975) (applying Younger in a
civil public nuisance context); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 435 (1977)
(applying Younger in a civil action premised on fraudulently obtained public
assistance benefits).
73. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
74. See id. at 439 (“These major distinctions preclude this court from extending
the principles of Younger, . . . beyond the quasi-criminal situations set forth in
Huffman.”).
75. See id. at 444 (“[T]he principles of Younger and Huffman are broad enough to
apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil enforcement action
such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity.”).
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proceeding was brought by the state in its sovereign capacity and
(2) was initiated to vindicate an important state policy, such as the
fiscal integrity of its welfare program.76
Younger was cut even further “adrift from its original doctrinal
moorings”77 when the Court eliminated the requirement that the
state must bring a pending state proceeding in its sovereign capacity.
Although both parties in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.78 were
corporations, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal court
should not enjoin state proceedings because the state’s interest in the
proceedings was “so important that exercise of the federal judicial
power would disregard the comity between the States and the
National Government.”79 Yet, the only interest mentioned by the
Court is one that exists in all cases—the interest in securing
compliance with the judgments of the state courts.80
Although the Court may not have articulated the concerns
underlying the Younger noninterference doctrine, some possible
justifications for the outcome are discernible. Professor Martin
Redish identified the following four possible reasons for federal court
abstention in the Younger line of cases: (1) to avoid the suggestion
that state judges are unable or unwilling to enforce federal rights;
(2) to prevent interference with state court proceedings; (3) to
preserve the discretion of the state executive officials; and (4) to
avoid interference with state legislative policies.81 Professor Redish
concluded, however, that these rationales are “inconsistent or
internally flawed.”82
With respect to the first justification, it is difficult to assess
empirically whether state judges are insulted when cases involving
federal claims are removed from their dockets. As a practical matter,
the federal injunction consists of “removal of a state case from a list of
unheard cases kept in the clerk’s office.”83 The state judge may not
be aware of the federal proceeding. Moreover, even if aware of the
case, the state judge might welcome the reduction in her caseload,
76. Id.
77. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 30 n.2 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
78. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
79. Id. at 11.
80. See id. at 13 (noting the “importance to the States of enforcing the orders and
judgments of their courts”).
81. See Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a
Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 465-66 (1978).
82. Id. at 466.
83. Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C. L. REV.
59, 70 n.65 (1981).
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particularly the removal of a controversial case.84 Finally, the litigant
decides whether to seek federal relief and the insult, if any, is a
product of the litigant’s conduct, not the conduct of the federal
courts.
The second possible justification, the desire to avoid interference
with the state court’s judicial process, certainly reflects a legitimate
concern. Repeated federal court interference with ongoing state
court litigation might lead to additional costs and delays in resolving
the dispute. These burdens may justify a comity policy that restricts
piecemeal interference with state judicial proceedings. Additional
costs and delays, however, do not support a policy that prohibits a
federal court injunction to prevent any federal proceeding
whatsoever in state court. Such an injunction would allow a case to
be heard in the federal forum and does not result in repeated
interference with the work of the state court.
Similarly, Younger-style abstention is not justifiable by a desire to
avoid interference with a state’s executive or legislative functions.
Any such interference would flow from a decision on the merits of
the claim,85 and would not necessarily result from the court forum,
which is the basis for the Younger doctrine. Indeed, the Younger
noninterference principle does not guarantee any specific result on
the underlying question of whether state officials have violated
federal law. Instead, Younger allocates the decision to the state court.
Of course, the unstated premise of the Younger line of cases may be
that state courts will be more sympathetic to the states’ interests and
less likely to find that state officials have violated federal law. Such a
premise, however, ignores the federal interest in the uniformity and
supremacy of federal law and is “embarrassingly inconsistent with . . .
the desire to avoid insulting state judges by questioning their
willingness to protect federal rights.”86
Noticeably absent from Younger and its offspring is any recognition
84. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 779 (3d ed. 1999) (“Since most
states have some form of electoral review of judges it is at least plausible that state
court judges prefer to have federal judges take the heat of declaring state laws
unconstitutional.”).
85. Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997) (noting that the Court has
“made clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement,
by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs. [W]e [have]
sustained statutes against constitutional challenge only after assuring ourselves that
they did not requires the States to enforce federal law”), with New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (denying congressional intrusion on state administrative
and legislative functions).
86. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 348 (2d ed. 1990).
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of a federal interest in having a federal forum available to hear the
federal claim. Congress plainly recognized a federal interest when it
enacted section 1983 and other Reconstruction Era laws. The
purpose of these provisions was to empower the federal courts to
serve as guardians of federal rights.87 Congress understood the
tensions created by federal judicial interference with state court
proceedings and, as a general matter, prohibited such intrusion in
the anti-injunction statute.88 That statute, however, created an
exception to the general prohibition for cases brought under section
1983.89 The Reconstruction efforts were intended to open the
“federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy
against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.”90
In the name of federalism, the Younger line of cases closed the
federal courts to many kinds of cases challenging state misconduct.
Unfortunately, the Court often used “sloganeering references”91 to
federalism concerns and failed to identify the real threats to our
federal structure or to balance the national and local interests at
stake. Indeed, a search for any recognition of the federal interest in
the Younger line of cases would be in vain. The Younger doctrine,
initially sensitive to the legitimate interests of both state and federal
governments, became engrossed in only the former. As Justice
Stewart observed, the federal-state balance became “distorted beyond
recognition.”92
One final aspect of the Younger line of cases is noteworthy,
particularly as background for the discussion of Alden. An underlying
assumption of those cases is that state courts would be available to
resolve the federal claims. Whether state courts are in fact equally
willing and able to protect federal rights is a topic that some

87. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (observing that § 1983 was
intended as a means of enforcing the 14th Amendment in order “to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law . . .”).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) (outlining the requirements for obtaining a
federal injunction in a state court proceeding).
89. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242-43 (“[W]e conclude that, under the criteria
established in our previous decisions construing the anti-injunction statute, § 1983 is
an Act of Congress that falls within the ‘expressly authorized’ exception of that
law.”).
90. Id. at 239. See generally Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine:
Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1977) (discussing the
development of the Younger doctrine).
91. Gibbons, supra note 62, at 1117.
92. BRAVEMAN, supra note 5, at 97 (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 357
(1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
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academics dispute.93 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court assumed
that state courts would be open to federal claims and would be
competent to resolve them. As the Court stated, “we are unwilling to
assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity
to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several
States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional
obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal
law.”94 Thus, under Younger it was clear that some court would be
available to protect the federal interests.
B. Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court also used the Eleventh Amendment to unseat
the federal courts as guardians of federal rights and to return to a
pre-Reconstruction scheme for the enforcement of those rights.
Admittedly, the Eleventh Amendment has been the subject of
extensive debate among the Justices95 and within the legal academic
community.96 The purpose of this Section is not to enter the debate,
93. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 236 (1988) (proposing that “litigants with federal
constitutional claims should generally be able to choose the forum, federal or state,
in which to resolve their disputes”); Thomas Marvell, The Rationales for Federal
Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 1315 (determining that in the area of students’ rights litigation lawyers
overwhelmingly select federal courts to adjudicate federal questions); Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (reviewing the historical
preference for federal court adjudication of federal rights and offering an
institutional explanation for such preference); Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of
Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 215 (1983) (contending that parity
between federal and state courts concerning federal rights does exist).
94. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976).
95. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999). In responding to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, characterized the dissenting viewpoint as one
“which believes that States should not enjoy the normal constitutional protections of
sovereign immunity when they step out of their proper economic role to engage
in . . . ‘ordinary commercial ventures.’” Id.; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (holding, in a five Justice majority opinion, that the Indian
Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity).
96. See, e.g., ORTH, supra note 52, at 149-50; Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515,
516 (1978) (“There is . . . little agreement about many issues concerning the scope of
state immunity.”); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1983) (“The Eleventh
Amendment is one of the Constitution’s most baffling provisions . . . .”); Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1988) (“The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution is
an enigma of increasing concern to the Supreme Court and to scholars.”); Vicki C.
Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S.
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but rather to illustrate the Court’s use of the Eleventh Amendment to
restrict the federal courts’ availability to enforce federal laws against
the states. Like the Younger line of cases, the Court relied on vague
federalism concerns as a basis for the Eleventh Amendment’s
restriction on federal jurisdiction. So too, the Court largely ignored
the federal interests that might exist in having a federal forum decide
the cases.
The Court has explained97 that the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted to overrule the Chisholm98 decision. Beyond the reason for
the Amendment’s adoption, much remains in dispute. Until Alden,
the debate centered on whether the Amendment should be read as a
source of sovereign immunity that limits the federal courts’ power to
entertain claims arising under federal law against states. Four Justices
maintained that the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits against
states in federal court only when federal jurisdiction is based on
diversity.99 A Court majority adopted a much broader view, however,
concluding that the Amendment deprives the lower federal courts100
CAL. L. REV. 51, 52 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not clearly resolved
the issue of state sovereign immunity and Congress’ ability to override the Eleventh
Amendment); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (1975) (arguing that the distinction between Congress’
power to create a private, federal cause of action and the Judiciary’s power to imply a
cause of action is key to Eleventh Amendment analysis); Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1806 (1997) (advocating
that states adopt officer-liability rules and insurance/indemnity arrangements as a
more efficient means of ensuring state compliance with federal law rather than
attempting to interpret the Court’s Eleventh Amendment decisions).
97. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1890) (determining that the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment following the Chisholm decision is indicative of
the fact that Chisholm was rejected by the country); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 101
(“The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment soon changed the result in
Chisholm . . . .”) (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that the
Constitution provides the Supreme Court with jurisdiction when a citizen of a state
sues a different state).
99. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (maintaining that
“there can be no serious debate . . . over whether Congress has the power to ensure
that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued.
Congress’ authority in that regard is clear”); id. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
that “the history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment convincingly shows that
it reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively under the citizenstate diversity clauses”).
100. It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude
Supreme Court review of suits against the states. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 166 (1999) (noting that there is a “long established and
uniform practice of reviewing state court decisions on federal matters, regardless of
whether the State was a plaintiff or defendant in trial court”); McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Fla. Dep’t. of Bus. Regulation, 496 U.S.
18, 27 (1990) (holding that “we have repeatedly and without question accepted
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of jurisdiction over any case against a non-consenting state.101 The
language of the Amendment, of course, refers only to suits brought
“against one of the United States by Citizens of another State” and,
thus, does not support the broad reading. The majority, however,
rejected a literal interpretation of the Amendment and instead held
that it reinstated the Framers’ original intent that a non-consenting
state could be immune from suit in federal court.
This conclusion erects a substantial barrier to the enforcement of
federal rights against the states in the federal courts. Eighteen years
after Hans v. Louisiana,102 the Court navigated a route around that
obstacle. In Ex parte Young,103 the Court held that federal courts could
issue injunctive relief against state officials in violation of federal laws.
The Court stated:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding
under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power
to impart to him immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of
104
the United States.

The Ex parte Young doctrine, allowing federal jurisdiction over suits
against state officials, essentially ensured that states must comply with
federal law. Indeed, one could interpret Ex parte Young to support
the proposition that Hans was simply a pleading problem. The
Eleventh Amendment would preclude federal jurisdiction over
lawsuits naming the state as defendant, but would not preclude
jurisdiction to review issues of federal law arising in suits brought against States in
state court”); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934)
(determining that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review suits by the United
States against a state is “inherent in the constitutional plan”). In McKesson, the Court
explained that when a state court entertains a case, “the State assents to appellate
review by this Court of the federal issues raised in the case ‘whoever may be the
parties to the original suit, whether private persons, or the state itself.’” 496 U.S. at 30
(quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 585 (1837)). The
Court adheres to this constructive waiver in the context of its own appellate
jurisdiction despite its unwillingness to rely on constructive waivers of immunity to
suits against the states in the lower federal courts or in state courts. See College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228 (determining that a state must make a “clear declaration” of
its consent to be ruled).
101. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (determining that the Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing private party suits against
“uncontesting states”).
102. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
103. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
104. Id. at 159-60 (emphasis added).
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federal jurisdiction in suits naming the state official as the defendant.
The Court rejected any notion that the Eleventh Amendment
restriction on federal jurisdiction can be avoided by artful pleading.105
To the contrary, the Court has whittled away at the Ex parte Young
doctrine and utilized the Eleventh Amendment as a vehicle to restrict
access to the federal courts. The decision in Edelman v. Jordan106
illustrates this pattern. The plaintiffs in Edelman were welfare
recipients who alleged that Illinois officials denied welfare benefits in
violation of the Constitution and federal statutes.107 They sought
retroactive repayment of the wrongfully withheld welfare benefits and
an injunction compelling the state officials to comply with federal
law.108 The district court found the state officials in violation of
federal regulations, ordered them to repay the illegally withheld
benefits, and enjoined them from future violations.109 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, relying on Ex parte Young to conclude that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude a federal court from
ordering such relief against the Illinois officials.110
The Supreme Court agreed that the Eleventh Amendment did not
preclude the prospective injunctive relief against the state officials
but held that it prevented a federal court from directing the
repayment of the welfare benefits.111 The Court noted that Ex parte
Young was a “watershed case” that permitted the Civil War
Amendments to “serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield.”112
The majority, however, observed that the relief in Ex parte Young was
prospective only, and that the award of retroactive relief “stands on
quite a different footing.”113 In concluding that the Eleventh
105. Id. at 168 (noting that “it has never been supposed there was any suit against
the state by reason of serving the writ [of habeaus corpus] upon one of the officers of
the state in whose custody the person was found”); infra notes 106-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s tendency to restrict the application of Ex
parte Young in cases where state officials were sued).
106. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
107. See id. at 655-56.
108. See id. at 656.
109. See id.
110. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1973) (determining that
although Ex parte Young requires a state’s consent for a citizen to recover monetary
damages, a difference exists between damages and restitution, and the plaintiffs are
entitled to restitution as an equitable remedy).
111. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 (noting that the district court’s opinion
contained both retroactive and prospective relief and that under the Eleventh
Amendment only prospective relief is constitutional).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 665 (noting that the retroactive award would derive from funds from
the general revenues of the state “and thus the award resembles far more closely the
monetary award against the State itself, . . . than it does the prospective injunctive
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Amendment bars retroactive relief, the Court conceded that the
difference between the type of relief permitted by Ex parte Young and
the relief barred “will not in many instances be that between day and
night.”114 Indeed, the Ex parte Young injunction had an impact on the
state’s treasury because the injunction prevented the Attorney
General from collecting monetary penalties.115
Similarly, the
prospective relief in Edelman116 would have had financial implications
for Illinois because the state would have been required to process
welfare applications and award benefits more promptly in the future.
Nevertheless, the Court determined that the financial impact of an
order directing retroactive benefits is different from the impact of an
order granting prospective injunctive relief.117
Without clearly
explaining the difference, the Court suggested that the state might be
better able to budget for future compliance.118
As in the Younger line of cases, the Court in Edelman protected the
state without considering the federal interest. To be sure, a federal
court order requiring the state to pay retroactive welfare benefits
affects the state’s ability to implement its own legislative policies.119
Equally clear is the threat to the federal interest when Illinois fails to
comply with federal law. Congress determined that national policy is
served best by prompt payment of welfare benefits to people living in
poverty. The federal law reflected Congress’ intent to implement this
policy. Other than a passing mention in a footnote,120 the Court
made no reference at all to this federal interest, nor did the opinion
discuss a need to have a federal forum to resolve the dispute.
relief awarded in Ex parte Young”) (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 667.
115. See id. (citing cases in which the award of injunctive relief had the indirect
effect of imposing monetary penalties on the state).
116. The prospective relief sought was a permanent injunction requiring the state
to award all plaintiff’s benefits wrongfully withheld. See id. at 656.
117. See id. at 666-68 (determining that the payment of state funds as a form of
compensation for past wrongs as opposed to “a necessary consequence of
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination” violates
the Eleventh Amendment).
118. Id. at 666 n.11 (holding that although welfare decisions by federal courts may
have an impact on a state’s finances, the financial impact is not the same as when “a
federal court applies Ex parte Young to grant prospective declaratory and injunctive
relief”).
119. For example, in Edelman, the Court noted that the “ordering by a federal
court of retroactive payments to correct delays in . . . [benefit] processing will
invariably mean there is less money available for payments for the continuing
obligations of the public aid system.” Id. at 666 n.11.
120. See id. (quoting with approval the statement of Judge McGowan in Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 1972), that a federal policy advanced by
retroactive payments is “the satisfaction of the ascertained needs of an impoverished
persons”).
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In the two decades after Edelman, the Court continued to restrict
the reach of Ex parte Young, forcing litigants out of federal courts. In
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,121 the Court noted that
the Eleventh Amendment “bars a suit against state officials when ‘the
state is the real, substantial party in interest.’”122 In general, this bar
to a federal court suit exists whether the litigant seeks money
damages or injunctive relief.123 The Ex parte Young exception is
“necessary to permit the federal court to vindicate federal rights and
hold state officials responsible to ‘the supreme authority of the
United States.’”124 The doctrine applies only when the litigant
requests a federal court to order prospective relief against state
officials who are violating federal law.125 Thus, the Pennhurst Court
held that Ex parte Young does not allow a federal court to direct state
officials to comply with state law.126 The Eleventh Amendment, it
ruled, bars such relief.127
More recently, the Court continued to pay lip service to the
importance of Ex parte Young while limiting its application. In
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,128 the Court determined that Ex parte
Young was inapplicable where Congress has provided a remedial
scheme for the enforcement of the federal right against the state.129
In such circumstances, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
bars the federal action, even if the parties seek prospective injunctive
relief.130 Moreover, two Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, appear ready to abandon Ex parte Young completely and to
permit a federal court to enjoin state officials only when there is no
121. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
122. Id. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323
U.S. 459, 464 (1945), that although decisions prior to Pennhurst were not consistent
on Eleventh Amendment issues, the principle that the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against state officials when the State is a party is firmly established).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 105 (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).
125. See id. (“Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine
rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.”).
126. See id. at 106 (“We conclude that Young . . . [is] inapplicable in a suit against
state officers on the basis of state law.”).
127. See id. (determining that a federal court mandate to state officers to conform
their conduct to state law violates the federalism principle underlying the Eleventh
Amendment).
128. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
129. See id. at 74 (“[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme
for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state
officer based upon Ex parte Young.”).
130. See id. at 73-76 (determining that even in cases of prospective injunctive
relief, Ex parte Young is inapplicable to the case at hand as Congress has created a
remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal right).
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available state forum.131
Finally, while Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas were not
willing to join that “reformulation,”132 they opened the door to
additional restrictions on Ex parte Young. In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho,133 the Court determined that a federal court could not
issue prospective injunctive relief against state officials because such
relief would interfere with the state’s regulatory power over land.134
The exact scope of this further limitation on Ex parte Young is unclear
and undoubtedly will be determined by future cases. The limitation
might apply only to cases involving the state’s sovereign interest in
land. Alternatively, the restriction might apply more broadly
whenever the party challenges a state’s regulatory powers, regardless
of the specific area of regulation. Either approach represents a
dilution of the power recognized in Ex parte Young. As the dissenters
observed, the fact that the state’s regulatory power is the focus of the
case should have no bearing on the application of Ex parte Young,135
which involved an effort to enjoin the state’s regulation of railroad
rates, an activity that could be considered “central to state
sovereignty.”136
The Court has recognized only two avenues to avoid the Eleventh
Amendment restriction on federal district court jurisdiction. First,
the restriction is inapplicable if the state waives its immunity and
consents to the lawsuit in federal court.137 Consistent with the general
states’ rights approach, the Court has adopted a “stringent” test to
establish a waiver.138 A general consent to sue and to be sued is
insufficient to constitute a waiver.139 Moreover, a state’s consent to
suit in its own courts,140 or in any court of competent jurisdiction,141 is
131. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 271 (1997) (stating that Ex
parte Young has special significance when there is no available state forum).
132. Id. at 296.
133. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
134. Id. at 294.
135. Id. at 309 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The relevant enquiry . . . is whether the
state officers are exercising ultra vires authority over the disputed submerged
lands.”).
136. Id. at 310.
137. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999) (noting that immunity from suit is not absolute);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (maintaining that waiver
of the immunity is a “well-established exception[] to the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment”).
138. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
139. See Florida Dep’t. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home
Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981) (determining that a specific waiver of immunity is
necessary to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment).
140. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900) (holding that although
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not deemed to be a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in
federal court. Finally, a waiver will not be implied from a state’s
voluntary participation in federally regulated conduct.142 Such an
implied waiver will not be found even when the state engages in
commercial ventures unassociated with customary sovereign
activities.143
Second, Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity and thereby subject states to suits in federal court. The
Court, however, has construed congressional power very narrowly.
The federal Rehabilitation Act, for example, prohibits recipients of
federal funds from discriminating against disabled persons in making
employment decisions and expressly authorizes enforcement actions
against them in federal court.144 Despite the existence of the Act, the
Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court
lawsuit against a state that received federal funds.145 The Court stated:
“A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of
unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject the States to federal
jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.”146
The Court has found a way to protect the states from federal court
jurisdiction, even when congressional intent to lift the Eleventh
Amendment immunity has been unmistakably clear. The plaintiffs in
Seminole Tribe sued to enforce the provisions of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act,147 which Congress enacted under the Indian
Commerce Clause.148 The Act includes a clear statement of Congress’
intent to abrogate state immunity from an enforcement lawsuit in
California consented to have its Treasurer sued in state court “we think it has not
consented to be sued except in one of its own courts”).
141. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946)
(concluding that a state has a right “to reserve for its own tax litigation because of
the direct impact of such litigation upon its finances”).
142. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (holding that the state’s
participation in a federal program does not constitute the express waiver necessary to
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment).
143. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2229 (1999) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. Docks
Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (reasoning that as state sovereign immunity is
constitutionally protected a waiver must be express)).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (providing the remedies in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 be available).
145. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985) (holding that
Congress must use specific language to subject states to federal jurisdiction).
146. Id.
147. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power to regulate
commerce “within the Indian Tribes”).
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federal court.149 A divided Court ruled, however, that Congress lacks
the power under Article I to lift the state’s immunity from a lawsuit in
federal court.150
The Seminole majority did not question the continuing vitality of its
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer151 holding that Congress, under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, may abrogate a state’s immunity from suit
in federal court.152 The Seminole Court observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment expanded federal power “at the expense of state
autonomy . . . [and] fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power struck by the Constitution.”153
This distinction
demonstrates the supremacy of federal law, as the states lost some of
their autonomy when they ratified a Constitution that conferred
power to the central government in Article I.154 Seminole was a
particularly inappropriate case to announce a narrow construction of
congressional power because the issue involved a statute that sought
to regulate Indian affairs,155 an area in which Congress historically has
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994) (setting forth the circumstances under
which a U.S. district court has jurisdiction under the Act).
150. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (“Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”). The
Seminole decision sparked an active scholarly discussion. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant,
The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 769-72 (1998) (discussing the
implications of recent Supreme Court decisions on state-federal relations); David P.
Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 547-51 (1997)
(arguing that Congress does not have the power to grant federal courts jurisdiction
over non-Article III matters); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment,
and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 546 (1997)
(contending that Seminole Tribe was wrongly decided and presenting the
repercussions of that decision); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (discussing the implications of Seminole
Tribe); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV.
102, 103 (1996) (contending that after Seminole Tribe the states are still accountable
in the federal court system for federal law violations); Vazquez, supra note 96, at 1691
(presenting the contradiction between the decisions in McKesson and Seminole Tribe
on the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
151. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
152. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (“[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
allowed congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that
Amendment.”).
153. Id. (citing the finding of the Fitzpatrick court). During the past term, the
Court has construed narrowly Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate
immunity. See infra notes 294-326 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
erosion of Congress’ power to abrogate state immunity from suits involving federal
law violations).
154. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61 (“While . . . Congress’ power . . . would be
incomplete without the power to abrogate, that statement is made solely in order to
emphasize the broad scope of Congress’ authority. . . .”).
155. See id. at 48 (citing Congress’ Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §
2701 (1994), as the statute involved in the litigation).
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exercised plenary power to the exclusion of the states.156
The cumulative impact of the Eleventh Amendment developments
prior to this past term had a very practical impact on litigants seeking
to remedy the deprivation of federal rights by states. In theory, a
litigant could sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief in
federal court and bring a separate lawsuit in state court for damages
or retroactive benefits.157 This approach, however, not only increases
the cost of litigation but also raises the risk that preclusion rules
might bar litigation of one of the cases.158 Thus, as in the Younger line
of cases, the developments forced litigants into state court to enforce
their federal rights.159 A federal court may consider a litigant’s claim
only through Supreme Court review.160
Until Alden the assumption was that the Eleventh Amendment
would not prevent a suit against state officials in state court.161
Edelman itself is instructive on this point. In Edelman, the issue was
whether Illinois had waived its common law sovereign immunity in its
state courts.162 The Court viewed such common law immunity as
separate and distinct from the Eleventh Amendment immunity.163
The Court responded: “Whether Illinois permits such a suit to be
brought against the State in its own courts is not determinative of

156. See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 90 (1977)
(upholding an Act of Congress providing for distribution of funds to Delaware
Indians); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886) (finding that the power
of the federal government is necessary “because it alone can enforce its laws on the
tribes”); see also Martha Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce
Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 17-18 (1997) (explaining that Congress believed the states
had “proved too ready to enrich themselves at the expense of Indian tribes and
Indian lands”).
157. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). In Migra, after a
school board refused to renew her claim, the plaintiff sued in state court for breach
of contract and subsequently sued in federal court for injunctive relief. See id. at 7880.
158. See id. at 85 (holding that petitioner/plaintiff’s state court judgment has a
preclusive effect in the federal court); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (stating
that federal courts generally have consistently accorded preclusive effect to issues
decided by state courts).
159. See, e.g., Allen, 449 U.S. at 104 (“There is, in short, no reason to believe that
Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted
opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the
issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at
all.”).
160. See supra note 100 (discussing case law interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment).
161. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
162. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 n.19 (1974) (“Respondent urges that
the state of Illinois has abolished its common-law sovereign immunity in its state
courts . . . .”).
163. See id.
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whether Illinois has relinquished its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit in the federal courts.”164
Moreover, on remand in Edelman, the Court of Appeals ordered
state officials to notify class members of the availability of state
administrative procedures to determine whether they were entitled to
retroactive benefits.165
The state officials maintained that the
Eleventh Amendment barred such notice because it would have led
to the payment of state funds for retroactive benefits.166 The Supreme
Court rejected that argument, finding that the order fell on the Ex
parte Young side of the line.167 The Court determined that the
Eleventh Amendment was not implicated because “whether or not
the class members will receive retroactive benefits rests entirely with
the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not the federal
court.”168 The Court did not indicate whether the state officials could
assert a constitutionally based immunity in state court.169
The Court addressed that specific issue in Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Railways Commission.170 In the case, Kenneth Hilton initially
filed an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”)171
in federal court against the Railways Commission, a state agency.172
While the case was pending, the Supreme Court decided that the
Jones Act,173 which incorporated the remedial provisions of FELA,
does not abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.174 Based
on the assumption that the Eleventh Amendment barred his FELA
action, Hilton dismissed the federal court suit and refiled in South

164. Id.
165. See Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (holding
that a modified notice advising applicants that a state administrative procedure exists
does not violate of the Eleventh Amendment).
166. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1979) (deciding the issue of
whether the notice constituted permissible prospective relief or a retroactive one that
requires the payment of funds from the state treasury).
167. See id. at 347-48 (finding that the notice simply apprises plaintiff class
members of the existence of administrative procedures already available).
168. Id. at 348.
169. See id. at 349 (concluding that “[t]he notice in effect simply informs class
members that their federal suit is at an end, that the federal court can provide them
with no further relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures
which they may wish to pursue”).
170. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
171. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
172. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199 (stating that the commission is a common carrier
engaged in interstate commerce and is an agency of the State of South Carolina).
173. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
174. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)
(holding that the general language of the Jones Act does not authorize suits against
the states in federal court).
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Carolina state court.175 Subsequently, the South Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that FELA does not subject a state to liability in state
courts.176 The Supreme Court reversed, making quite clear that the
case involved two distinct inquires.177 The first inquiry was one of
statutory construction, and the Court held that FELA does apply to
state-owned railroads.178 The second inquiry was whether the
Eleventh Amendment bars the lawsuit.179 The Court concluded that
the holding of Welch was not determinative of whether a FELA action
may be maintained in state court against a state agency.180 The Court
repeated that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state
courts.181 The Court reversed the state court’s judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings.182
More recently, even Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist
appeared to assume in Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho183 that the
Constitution would not preclude a suit in state court against state
officials.184 While finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
federal court from hearing the Tribe’s claim to ownership of
specified submerged lands,185 they emphasized that the state court was
available to resolve the federal claim:
Neither in theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to
have federal claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh
Amendment immunity would be applicable in federal court but for
an exception based on Young. . . . Assuming the availability of a
state forum with the authority and procedures adequate for the
effective vindication of federal law, due process concerns would not
be implicated by having state tribunals resolve federal-question
186
cases.

The Eleventh Amendment and Younger line of cases effectively
175. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199-200.
176. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 411 S.E.2d 424 (S.C. 1990).
177. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 206 (“The requirement also serves to make parallel two
separate inquiries into the state liability.”).
178. Id. at 201-04.
179. See id. at 206.
180. See id. at 204.
181. Id. at 205 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1989); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980); and Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 420-21 (1979)).
182. See id. at 207.
183. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
184. See id. at 287-88 (allowing Idaho to rely on Eleventh Amendment immunity
and permitting the state to insist upon responding to the Tribe’s claims in its own
courts instead of a federal forum).
185. See id. at 274 (finding the Idaho State courts to be an adequate judicial forum
for resolving the dispute between the tribe and the state).
186. Id. at 274-75.
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limited the federal courts’ role in enforcing federal law against state
officials.187 The parallel trends re-established, to some extent, the preReconstruction scheme for federal law enforcement.188 In many
circumstances, litigants are forced to pursue their federal claims
against state officials in state court, and then seek Supreme Court
review.189 The Court inadequately explained federalism concerns as
the basis for restricting federal jurisdiction and returning to the
earlier scheme.190 Moreover, in its deference to states’ rights, the
Court paid little, if any, attention to the federal interests in providing
a federal forum.191 Indeed, the Court seemed to reject the idea that
“one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double
source of protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism is not
served when the federal half of that protection is crippled.”192
Although the federal judiciary’s role was restricted, both trends
presupposed that state courts would be available to protect federal
rights from state intrusion.193 During the past term, the Court began
dismantling that remaining half of the protection.
II. LIMITING THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS
The Alden case began in 1992 when ninety-six current and former
probation and parole officers sued their employer, the State of
Maine, in federal district court, alleging that the state failed to pay
overtime as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).194
Government agencies are included within FLSA’s definition of
employer.195 FLSA provides that an action to recover liability “may be
maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any

187. See Soifer & Macgill, supra note 90, at 1142 (stating that in Younger v. Harris
the Court began limiting federal judicial power and thereby advantaging the states).
188. See id. at 1143 (asserting that the Court’s holding in Younger undermined the
post-Reconstruction concept of federalism).
189. See, e.g., supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (explaining that federal
courts do not have the power to adjudicate disputes brought against state officers
and involving state law).
190. See Soifer & Macgill, supra note 90, at 1142 (stating that the Court’s opinion
in Younger articulated vague doctrines of equity and states’ rights rhetoric in order to
justify restricting federal jurisdiction).
191. See, e.g., id. at 1142-43 (discussing how the Younger Court subordinated
federal courts to state courts as “guarantors of civil liberties”).
192. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and Protections of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
193. See id. at 502-03 (“Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to
safeguard individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective
role of the federal judiciary.”).
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
195. See id. § 203(d) (defining the term “employer” to include a public agency).
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Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees.”196 The action was commenced before the Seminole
decision, and at the time the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the
federal lawsuit because FLSA contained a clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate the state’s immunity.197
Maine’s defense was that that the officers were exempt from the
overtime provisions of FLSA.198 The district court determined,
however, that FLSA covered the plaintiffs, who were only partially
exempt.199 Following that ruling, Maine altered its policy to comply in
the future with federal law.200 Nevertheless, a dispute remained over
the entitlement to overtime back pay, and the district judge
submitted the plaintiffs’ claims to a special master.201 While the
proceedings on damages were pending, the Supreme Court decided
Seminole, holding that Congress lacks the power under Article I to
abrogate a state’s immunity from suit in federal court.202 Relying on
Seminole, the state moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted the
motion.203 On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that Seminole
required the federal lawsuit to be dismissed.204
The plaintiffs then refiled the action in state court.205 Despite the
clear statutory language authorizing a state court action under FLSA,
the Superior Court dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of sovereign
immunity.206 The plaintiffs appealed to the Maine Supreme Court,
which framed the issue in a rather interesting fashion.207 The court
196. Id. § 216(b).
197. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Congress has clearly
manifested its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from private FLSA suits in
federal courts. . . .”).
198. See id. at 41.
199. See Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3, 6 (D. Me. 1993) (finding that the plaintiffs
were not exempt from FLSA’s coverage).
200. See Mills, 118 F.3d at 41 (“Following the district court’s ruling, the state
brought itself into compliance with FLSA’s wage and hour requirements.”).
201. See id. (stating that the special master was to settle dispute between litigants as
to how much overtime backpay Maine owed the probation officers).
202. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (“The Eleventh
Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being
sued in federal court.”).
203. See Mills, 118 F.3d at 41.
204. See id. at 56 (“[W]e conclude that the district court’s decision to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct.”). The court also concluded that
FLSA’s abrogation of immunity could not be viewed appropriately as an exercise of
Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. See id. at 48.
205. See Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998).
206. See id. (granting the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the
grounds of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity).
207. See id.
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did not focus on whether the state was immune under the state’s
common law or a state statute. Instead, the court addressed the
question of “whether state sovereign immunity, as reflected in the
Eleventh Amendment, protects the State from this federally created
cause of action in its own courts.”208 A divided court answered the
question in the affirmative.209 The majority relied on quotations
taken out of context from Seminole,210 and observed that “[i]f Congress
cannot force the states to defend in federal court against claims by
private individuals, it similarly cannot force the states to defend in
their own courts against these same claims.”211
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari212 to resolve
this conflict among the lower courts.213 At first glance, the case looks
like an easy one to decide. FLSA explicitly applies to the states, and
the Court previously upheld the constitutionality of the Act in
Garcia.214 Because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state
court,215 the state might try to assert a sovereign immunity defense
based on state law. If state law conferred immunity under such
circumstances, however, it would be inconsistent with FLSA, which
states that private parties may bring enforcement suits in state
court.216 The sovereign immunity defense, therefore, should fail
under the Supremacy Clause.217 Hilton supports this result218 and
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 173-74 (“Although Congress may have intended to subject the states
to the overtime provisions of the FLSA, it does not have the necessary power,
pursuant to the Constitution, to accomplish this end.”).
210. See id. at 174.
211. Id.
212. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
213. See Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998), abrogated by
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress can not subject a state to
suit in state court without its consent).
214. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)
(deciding that the “FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Congress’ power under
the Commerce Clause”).
215. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”) (emphasis added).
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) (“An action to recover liability . . . may be
maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees. . . .”).
217. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land. . . .”).
218. See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text; see also Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (noting that “[f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts . . .
because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the
States as laws by the state legislature”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (stating
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Seminole is easily distinguishable on the ground that it dealt with
Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court.219
Alden may illustrate that even easy cases can make bad law.
Continuing to protect states’ rights,220 the Court held for the first time
that a state’s sovereign immunity in state court is constitutionally
based221 and that Congress lacks the power under Article I to abrogate
this immunity.222 The Court conceded, as it must, that the Eleventh
Amendment does not literally support this result.223 Rather, the
Court pieced together arguments based on “history, practice,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution”224 in concluding
that the states’ immunity in these circumstances is supported by
“fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.”225
“[p]rinciples of federalism, as well as the Supremacy Clause, dictate that such a state
law must not give way to vindication of the federal right when that right is asserted in
state court”).
219. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Respondent’s motion to
dismiss argued that “the suit violated the State’s sovereign immunity from suit in
federal court.” Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (stating that the
federal government may neither issue directives requiring states to address particular
problems, nor require officers of the states to administer or enforce any federal
regulatory program); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997)
(finding that Idaho’s “dignity and status of its statehood allows [the state] to rely on
its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to [the] claims in
its own courts”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76 (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being
sued in federal court); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding
that the federal government may not compel states to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program).
221. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (stating that “[t]his separate and
distinct structural principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power
established by Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the
Constitution”).
222. See id. at 732 (“Nor can we conclude that the specific Article I powers
delegated to Congress necessarily include, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper
Clause or otherwise, the incidental authority to subject the States to private suits as a
means of achieving objectives otherwise within the scope of the enumerated
powers.”).
223. “The Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than established sovereign
immunity as a constitutional principle; it follows that the scope of the State’s
immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by
fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.” See id. at 728-29.
224. Id. at 741.
225. Id. at 729. My criticism of Alden focuses on the Court’s attempt to use
federalism as a justification for the result. Another criticism may be directed against
what appears to be a misapplication of sovereign immunity. As Justice Holmes
explained, a sovereign is immune “on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.” Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (deciding that a
Michigan statute addressing maritime and admiralty issues was constitutional). In
Alden, of course, the suit is not against the United States, which is the authority that
made the law. For a discussion of sovereign immunity more generally, see CLYDE
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For historical evidence, the majority pointed to the ratification
debates, excerpts from the Federalist Papers, and debates
surrounding the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.226 To be
sure, this material supports the proposition that the states’ sovereign
immunity was an important matter. After the Revolutionary War, the
states were heavily indebted and were concerned about being sued in
newly created federal courts.227 The prompt response to Chisholm
underscored the seriousness of the states’ concern in the issue.228 The
historical evidence, however, does not address the issue of a state’s
immunity from suit in its own court but rather focuses on immunity
in federal court.229 The Court previously reviewed this historical
material in Nevada v. Hall and concluded that “all of the relevant
debate[ ] concerned questions of federal-court jurisdiction and the
extent to which the States, by ratifying the Constitution and creating
federal courts, had authorized suits against themselves in those
courts.”230
Even the historical context surrounding the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment does not assist in resolving the issue in Alden.
The Court remains divided over the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment.231 However, acceptance of the majority’s view at best
leads to the conclusion that the Amendment was intended to restore
an original understanding that Article III did not alter state sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court. That view begs the question of
whether the source of the immunity is the common law or the
Constitution and, in any event, whether it focuses only on immunity
in federal court.
The Alden majority also relied on congressional practice to support
JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972).
226. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. Although the Court relies heavily on the Federalist
Papers, it previously recognized that the “‘Federalist reads with a split personality’ on
matters of federalism.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997) (quoting
DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR
FEDERAL SYSTEM 198-99 (3d ed. 1996)).
227. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979) (examining the rise of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States in addressing the issue of
whether a state is constitutionally immune from suit in the courts of another state).
228. See id. at 420 (noting that the decision in Chisholm quickly led to the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment).
229. See id. at 420-21 (emphasizing that the historical evidence, which focuses on
suits against states in federal courts, does not readily clarify the issue before the court
of a state’s immunity from suits in another state’s courts).
230. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added).
231. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (detailing the jurisprudential
evolution of the Eleventh Amendment as it applies conflicts between the federal and
state governments).
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its conclusion.232 Such reliance is troubling both in this specific
context and as a general matter of constitutional interpretation. The
majority suggested that its historical analysis was supported by early
congressional practice, which did not include statutes subjecting
states to suits in their own courts.233 As the majority conceded,234
Congress, in fact, enacted statutes that required state courts to hear
certain matters. Federal laws adopted between 1790-1802 obligated
state courts to perform the following duties: record applications for
citizenship, transmit naturalization records to the Secretary of State,
register aliens seeking naturalization, resolve controversies involving
seaworthiness of vessels, hear claims of slave owners to fugitive slaves,
accept claims of Canadian refugees who assisted the United States
during the Revolutionary War, and order deportation of alien
enemies.235 The majority noted the absence of any federal laws
subjecting states to lawsuits in state court and therefore concluded
that Congress did not believe it could authorize such suits.236
The Court’s conclusion is a nonsequitur. One cannot conclude
that because Congress failed to enact a law, Congress must lack the
power to do so. In this regard, Justice O’Connor in New York v. United
States noted:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would
have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because
the Framers would not have conceived that any government would
conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not
have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States,
would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon
the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in
language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal
237
Government’s role.

The dissenters in Alden echoed this theme when they observed that
232. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743-44 (1999) (stating that early
congressional practice provided convincing evidence of the Constitution’s meaning).
233. See id. (contrasting the lack of such statutes with the enactment of certain
statutes authorizing federal suits in state courts).
234. See id. (acknowledging the existence of various statutes authorizing federal
suits in state courts).
235. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-06 (1997) (stating that these
requirements “applied only in states that authorized their courts to conduct
naturalization proceedings”). See generally Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and
the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1925) (describing the statutory sources of
various obligatory duties of state courts).
236. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 744.
237. 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (holding that although Congress may offer
incentives to states to adopt programs to further federal interests, Congress may not
compel states to enact a federal regulatory program).

2000]

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RIGHTS AGAINST STATES

643

there are many instances, including FLSA, in which Congress enacted
laws that did not exist in the past.238
“The proliferation of
Government, State and Federal, would amaze the Framers, and the
administrative state with its reams of regulations would leave them
rubbing their eyes. But, the Framers surprise . . . is no threat to the
constitutionality of any one of them. . . .”239
The Alden majority’s reliance on precedent is equally unpersuasive.
No prior case addressed whether a state’s sovereign immunity is
constitutionally based or whether Congress can lift that immunity in
state court cases. The majority was forced to rely on language from
cases that are not on point,240 and strained to distinguish Hilton,
perhaps the most analogous case and the one decision supporting
the proposition that Congress may subject non-consenting states to
suit in state court.241 The Court read that decision narrowly,

238. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 807 (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting on the reach
of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
239. Id. More troubling perhaps than the lapse in logic is the majority’s
underlying premise of constitutional interpretation. The Court’s attempt in Alden
and other contexts to limit the powers of the federal branches of government to
those that may have existed centuries ago fundamentally restricts the function of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308 (1999) (holding that, in an action for monetary damages, a federal
court does not have the authority to issue a preliminary injunction barring a
defendant from transferring assets in which no lien or equitable interest is claimed);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the obligation to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers imposed an unconstitutional
obligation on state officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (ruling
that the monetary and access incentive of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
are consistent with the Constitution). While the current majority’s approach to
constitutional interpretation is worthy of a separate article, it is sufficient here to
recall Justice Holmes’ observation:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into
life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century
and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they
created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
ago.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (addressing whether a U.S. Treaty and
a related federal statute providing for the protection of migratory birds in the United
States and Canada is void as interfering with the states’ reserved rights, in a decision
upholding the treaty and the statute).
240. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 727-28 (examining decisions of the Court, such as Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1889), that held sovereign immunity barred a citizen from
bringing suit against his own state under federal question jurisdiction).
241. See supra notes 170-81 and accompanying text (denying the application of the
Eleventh Amendment to state courts and thereby subjecting non-consenting states to
state court adjudication).
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confining it to the specific circumstances of the case.242 Similarly, the
Court dismissed the relevance of the statement that the Eleventh
Amendment is inapplicable in state court as a “truism” that does not
resolve the issue.243 Finally, the majority simply ignored the implicit
understanding of Edelman that the state courts would be available to
resolve the federal question.244
The majority suggested that Ex parte Young supports its conclusion
that the states may assert a constitutionally based sovereign immunity
in state courts.245 The Court reasoned that “[h]ad we not understood
the States to retain a constitutional immunity from suit in their own
courts, the need for the Ex parte Young rule would have been less
pressing, and the rule would not have formed so essential a part of
our sovereign immunity doctrine.”246 This explanation of Ex parte
Young is novel, at best, and was not the previously stated basis for the
decision. Ex parte Young was not premised on a desire to provide some
forum for the lawsuit but rather on the need to provide a federal
forum to vindicate federal rights.247 The Court previously explained
the rationale for the Ex parte Young rule as follows:
[T]he injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the
obvious impact on the State itself, on the view that sovereign
immunity does not apply because an official who acts
unconstitutionally is “stripped of his official or representative
character,”. . . . [T]he Young doctrine has been accepted as
necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and
hold state officials responsible to “the supreme authority of the
248
United States.”

The real heart of Alden lies not in history, practice, or precedent,
but in the majority’s view of the structure of the Constitution or, as

242. Alden, 527 U.S. at 735-38 (stating that its holding was not a recognition of
congressional power to subject non-consenting states to suits in their own courts, but
was merely an adherence to “the narrow proposition that certain states had
consented to be sued by injured workers covered by FELA, at least in their own
courts”).
243. Id. at 735-36.
244. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (analyzing the application of
the Eleventh Amendment against state officials in state courts).
245. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 747.
246. Id.
247. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984)
(discussing the Ex Parte Young rule in addressing whether a federal court may award
injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law).
248. Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160
(1909), which noted that such principles include the requirement that Congress
treat the statute in a way that reflects their “status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation”).
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they described the matter, the “essential principles of federalism.”249
The Court observed that a threat to federalism exists because the
imposition of liability may impair the financial integrity of the state,
undermine state autonomy, and strain the state’s ability to govern
according to the will of its citizens.250 In making this observation, the
majority blurred the distinction between the substantive provisions of
the Act and the duty to enforce those provisions. The identified
threats are a product of the underlying substantive provisions of the
federal law that impose wage requirements on the state.251 Under the
Supremacy Clause, the states are bound to follow FLSA wage
requirements and, in doing so, may be forced to displace their own
policies and alter their own fiscal plans.252 The majority did not
question the constitutionality of these substantive requirements as
applied to the states, which have a checkered constitutional past,253
but were upheld in Garcia.254 The Court previously explained—and
Alden did not dispute255—that Garcia stands for the proposition that
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to impose
generally applicable requirements on the states.256 Any displacement
of state policies, thus, is a result of the states’ obligation to comply
with the substantive mandates of federal law, and does not flow from
the duty of state courts to enforce the provisions.
The requirement that state courts enforce the underlying federal
provisions undermines state policies only if one assumes that in the
absence of judicial enforcement the state is free to ignore federal law
249. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748.
250. See id. at 749 (detailing the Court’s reluctance to “commandeer the entire
political machinery of the state against its will”).
251. See id. at 712.
252. See id. at 806 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the law is settled that
federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause may bind states without
having to satisfy a test of undue incursion into state sovereignty”).
253. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities in holding that Congress may enforce wage
requirements against a local government’s mass-transit authority); National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 883 (1976) (holding that Congress may not impose wage
and hour requirements upon states).
254. See supra note 216 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which allows actions against any
employer in either federal or state court).
255. Indirectly, Alden seriously erodes the Garcia decision by making FLSA
unenforceable against the states, unless they waive their sovereign immunity. See
Alden, 527 U.S. at 759-60.
256. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (stating that in
previous cases, the Court had interpreted the Tenth Amendment to authorize
Congress to subject the states to generally applicable laws). In addition, the Alden
majority concedes that the federal government could bring enforcement
proceedings against the states, thereby creating the very threats supposedly created
by the challenged provision. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
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and pursue its own policies. This assumption would leave compliance
with federal law to the whim of state officials, thereby turning the
Supremacy Clause on its head, and defeating the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law.
Certainly, a federal law that requires state courts to entertain
federal claims has an impact on the allocation of state resources,
specifically state judicial resources.257 The time of judges, court
clerks, and other judicial officers would be devoted to the disposition
of federal claims.258 These costs, however, can be considered a threat
to state sovereignty only if federal law is analogous to the law of a
country. To the contrary, when Congress adopts a federal law it
speaks for all the people and all the states, and the federal policy is as
much the policy of the state as if enacted by the state legislature.259
The Court emphasized this point when it held that
[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and
just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State
laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards
the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction,
260
The laws of the United States and the
paramount, sovereignty.
individual state form “one system of jurisprudence, which
261
constitutes the law of the land for the State.”

The majority’s notion that federal power to authorize suits for
damages would “place unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens”262 is difficult to
understand. This view treats the states as completely separate and
independent sovereigns and overlooks the fundamental concept that
the “will” of state citizens should be viewed to include federal law.263
Even Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, two of the Court’s
strongest champions of states’ rights, previously recognized this basic
proposition:
Interpretation of federal law is the proprietary concern of state, as
257. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-51 (discussing the allocation of “scarce resources
among competing needs and interests”).
258. See id. (noting that this allocation “lies at the heart of the political process”).
259. See Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57
(1912) (discussing the inadmissibility of the notion that a state court may freely
decline jurisdiction when a federal law is in conflict with state policy).
260. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (discussing whether state courts
can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States).
261. Id. at 137.
262. Alden, 527 U.S. at 803.
263. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the will of the citizens of the
United States . . . trumps that of the citizens of the State”).
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well as federal, courts. It is the right and duty of the States, within
their own judiciaries, to interpret and to follow the Constitution
and all laws enacted pursuant to it, subject to a litigant’s right of
review in this Court in a proper case. The Constitution and laws of
the United States are not a body of law external to the States,
acknowledged and enforced simply as a matter of comity. The
Constitution is the basic law of the Nation, a law to which a State’s
ties are no less intimate than those of the National Government
itself. The separate States and the Government of the United States
are bound in the common cause of preserving the whole
264
constitutional order.

The majority appears to adopt a rather curious “symmetrical” view
of federalism. Under this view, state courts cannot be required to
hear FLSA claims against the states because federal courts cannot be
required to do so.265 This notion disregards the impact of the
Eleventh Amendment, which prevents the suit in federal court but
does not apply in the state forum.266 Moreover, the Court considered
and rejected a similar argument fifty years ago in Testa v. Katt.267
There, the State of Rhode Island argued that its state courts need not
enforce federal penal laws because federal courts are not required to
enforce state penal laws.268 Justice Black, writing for a unanimous
Court, rejected this suggestion, noting that it ignores the “effect of
the supremacy clause on the relation of federal laws to state courts.”269
The practical effect of Alden and Seminole is to limit the
enforceability of federal law against the states. In federal court, the
states are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which
Congress cannot lift using its Article I powers.270 In their own courts,
states can now assert the constitutionally based sovereign immunity
doctrine.271 Of course, as the majority suggested, the supremacy of
264. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1997) (analyzing
whether the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to seeking prospective relief against
individual state officers in a federal court based on a federal right).
265. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 753 (calculating that otherwise “Congress may in some
cases act only through instrumentalities of the state”).
266. See generally Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 261 (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars suit against states in federal courts based on federal rights, but does
not preclude the action in a state court).
267. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (considering the issue of whether a state can deny
enforcement to claims stemming from a valid federal law).
268. See id. at 388 (reasoning that a state is not obligated to enforce the penal laws
of government which is foreign, such as the United States).
269. Id. at 393-94.
270. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (addressing the issue
of whether a court should allow an action based on Ex parte Young where Congress
has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme).
271. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999) (stating that the Court is merely
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federal law might be achieved by the good faith of the states in
honoring federal requirements.272 In light of Maine’s initial failure to
comply with FLSA, however, it seems somewhat disingenuous to rely
on that good faith.
As a theoretical matter, there may be ways to lessen Alden’s
potential to seriously restrict an individual’s ability to enforce federal
law against a state. The decision, for example, does not preclude a
suit—in state or federal court—against state officials for prospective
injunctive relief.273 For two reasons, such an action for limited relief
may not be effective in securing state compliance with federal law.
First, the continued vitality of the Ex parte Young rule is uncertain. In
Seminole, the Court held that where Congress prescribes a detailed
remedial scheme, a court should hesitate before permitting an action
based on Ex parte Young.274 Moreover, in Coeur d’Alene the Court sent
signals to state officials that it may be willing to consider additional
limits on the Ex parte Young rule.275
Second, the availability of prospective relief alone may not be
sufficient to encourage state compliance with federal mandates.
Prior to Alden, a state was immune from damages in federal court276
attempting to establish “what the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution
sought to accomplish when they created a federal system”). Unless the Court is
ready to reconsider well-settled principles, even after Alden it should hold that a state
may not manipulate its sovereign immunity to discriminate against federal rights. See
Testa, 330 U.S. at 388 (deciding whether state courts can decline to enforce federal
laws if the state court deems a federal law to be outside of its jurisdiction). See
generally Nicole Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1152-53 (1984) (asserting that the Supremacy Clause
requires state courts to adjudicate federal claims and apply federal substantive law, or
to adjudicate claims under concurrent jurisdiction); Martin H. Redish & John E.
Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311,
340 (1976) (examining the obligation of state to hear federal cases).
272. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (declaring that the Court is “unwilling to assume
the states will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the
United States”).
273. See id. at 755-57 (discussing lawsuits to which the Court’s holding would not
extend).
274. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. See generally Vicki Jackson, supra note 150.
But see Monaghan, supra note 150 (arguing that Seminole leaves Ex parte Young intact).
275. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. State officials responded to
this signal in a recent case, Summit Medical Associates P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th
Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs sued Alabama officials, challenging enforcement of certain
abortion statutes. See id. at 1329. Relying on Coeur d’Alene, the officials argued that
the Eleventh Amendment bars the litigation and that the Ex parte Young rule did not
apply because the case involves special sovereignty interests. See id. at 1337-38. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument, finding that the state has a significant
interest in regulating abortions but that the relief would not impair that interest. See
id. at 1340-41. Nevertheless, as the case illustrates, state officials have read Coeur
d’Alene to create another possible argument limiting the Ex parte Young rule.
276. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1889) (holding that a state may not
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but faced the possibility of having a state court direct damages or
retroactive relief.277 After Alden, there is no real cost to the state for
ignoring federal law.278 Absent the threat of damages, the state has
little, if any, incentive to align its policies with federal requirements.279
State officials can ignore federal requirements, confident that if they
are sued and lose they simply will be directed to comply in the future.
In Alden itself, Maine eventually agreed to change its practices to
conform to FLSA but was relieved of any responsibility to pay
damages for its past illegality.280
Alden mentioned that individuals might attempt to enforce federal
law by filing damage actions against state officials in their individual
capacities.281 The Eleventh Amendment and the Alden doctrine bar
damage actions where the judgment would be paid by the state; they
do not restrict an award of damages to be paid by the state official.282
Practical restrictions, however, reduce the likelihood of recovering
money judgments from state officials. First, officials may assert a
personal immunity from damage actions. Some officials, such as
judges, are absolutely immune from lawsuits.283 Other officials, such
as members of the executive branch, have a qualified immunity and
cannot be held liable unless their conduct violates “clearly established

be sued by its own citizens or citizens of another state for money). The state was not
immune, of course, if it waived its immunity, see id. at 17, or Congress used its
Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate the immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 59 (indicating that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave congress the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
277. See, e.g., Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F. Supp. 749, 760 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that
New York state courts recognized the remedy of retroactive relief in public assistance
cases).
278. In some instances the federal law may authorize the prevailing party to
recover attorneys’ fees, thus imposing a possible cost on the state. In Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not
preclude an award of attorney’s fees against the state under the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994), because such an award is
“ancillary” to the injunctive relief. See id. at 690 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 668 (1974)).
279. Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980) (noting that the
threat of damages creates an incentive for officials of municipalities to institute rules
which will minimize the infringement of constitutional rights).
280. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759 (1999) (noting that although Maine
altered its conduct to comply with federal law, the state should not be stripped of its
immunity).
281. See id. at 757 (stating that a state officer in his official capacity is subject to a
suit for damages so long as the relief sought is not from the treasury).
282. See id. (indicating that an individual may obtain money damages if the relief
comes from the officer personally).
283. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1974); see also Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1976) (discussing absolute immunity of
prosecutors).
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statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”284 Second, actions seeking damages against public
officials can be heard by juries, which may be reluctant to impose
personal liability on individuals attempting to perform their public
duties.285 Finally, even if a jury directs a damage award, the officials
may be judgment-proof.
The majority in Alden also suggested that compliance with federal
law might be achieved through litigation brought by the United
States against the state.286 Undoubtedly, the states cannot assert an
Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity defense to suits
brought by the federal government.287 Although suits by the United
States may not be barred, for practical reasons, they are not likely to
serve as effective vehicles to enforce the federal law.288 In many
instances, the United States does not have adequate enforcement
resources.289 The experience with FLSA illustrates the difficulty.
When Congress amended FLSA in 1974, it determined that “the
enforcement capability of the Secretary of Labor is not alone
sufficient to provide redress in all or even a substantial portion of the
situations where compliance is not forthcoming.”290 Moreover,
Congress recognized that because the 1974 amendments extended
284. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (providing qualified immunity
for discretionary functions of government officials).
285. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 70 (1983) (reporting that the risk of an official being held personally liable
is very small).
286. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 759-60 (noting that the Constitution permits the United
States to bring a suit against a state on behalf of a party).
287. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934) (stating
that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over suits by the United States against a
state). In Alden, the Court attempted to justify the distinction between a suit by the
United States and one by private citizens as follows:
A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of
the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const., Art. II, §3,
differs in kind from the suit of an individual: While the Constitution
contemplates suits among the members of the federal system as an
alternative to extralegal measures, the fear of private suits against
nonconsenting States was the central reason given by the founders who
chose to preserve the States’ sovereign immunity. Suits brought by the
United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for each
suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad
delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.
Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56.
288. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (indicating that the federal
government’s enforcement capability is sufficient).
289. See id. (citing to congressional findings that the Secretary of Labor could not
provide adequate relief in all cases).
290. S. REP. NO. 93-690, at 26-27 (1974) (providing justification for why
enforcement mechanisms that permit state employees to bring suit are necessary).
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coverage to additional state employees “it is now all the more
necessary that employees in this category be empowered themselves
to pursue vindication of their rights.”291
The majority observed that enforcement actions against states are
permitted if Congress enacts the provisions using its Fourteenth
Amendment powers.292 The Court stated: “When Congress enacts
appropriate legislation to enforce this Amendment, . . . federal
interests are paramount, and Congress may assert an authority over
the States which would be otherwise unauthorized by the
Constitution.”293 What the Court gave with one hand, it took away
with the other. In two cases294 decided a month after Alden, the Court
narrowly construed congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate a state’s immunity.
The decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board295 exposes the Court’s limited view of the scope of Congress’
Fourteenth Amendment powers. There, the College Savings Bank
brought a patent infringement action under the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act296 against Florida
Prepaid, a Florida state entity.297 The Act, as amended in 1992,
expressly abrogates a state’s immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment or any other doctrine of sovereign immunity.298 The
congressional history299 indicates that Congress justified the Act under
the Commerce Clause,300 the Patent Clause,301 and section 5 of the
291. Id.
292. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (explaining that the states surrendered a portion of
sovereignty when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted).
293. Id.
294. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999) (holding that the Trademark Remedy Ratification Act
did not validly abrogate Florida’s sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
295. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
296. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(a)–(b), 2570 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994).
297. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203 (describing College Savings’ allegations
that Florida Prepaid willfully infringed upon its patent).
298. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994). The statute provides: “Any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of
a state acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. . . .” Id.
299. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, at 39-40 (1990) (stating the provision was a proper
exercise of Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign immunity) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I); S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,
3093-94 (indicating that Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign immunity was
constitutional “under the Patent Clause, Commerce Clause, and the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
300. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Fourteenth Amendment.302
The Court in Florida Prepaid agreed that the congressional intent to
abrogate state immunity from suit “could not have been made any
clearer.”303 Nevertheless, it concluded that Congress lacked power to
abrogate that immunity.304 Following its decision in Seminole, the
Court held that Congress lacked power under either the Commerce
Clause or the Patent Clause to lift a state’s immunity.305 Moreover, it
determined that the abrogation of immunity could not be justified by
Congress’ express reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment.306 Citing
City of Boerne v. Flores,307 the Court stated that for “Congress to invoke
§ 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”308
Initially, the Court determined that Congress failed to identify
conduct that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.309 The majority
observed that a state’s infringement of a patent does not itself violate
the Constitution.310 There is a taking of property without due process
only if the state provides inadequate remedies to the injured party.311
Congress, however, did not find intentional patent infringement by
the states, or the existence of inadequate state remedies.312 The Court
concluded that the “legislative record does not respond to a history of
‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the
sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5
legislation.”313
With respect to the second prong of the Flores test, the Court held
301. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
302. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
303. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205 (noting that Congress explicitly stated that
no state would be immune in § 296(a)).
304. See id. at 2210-11 (stating that the Patent Remedy Act was not a constitutional
exercise of Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign immunity on Fourteenth
Amendment or Article I grounds).
305. See id. at 2211 (indicating that Seminole Tribe prevents the Court from ruling
that the Act is constitutional abrogation of state sovereign immunity Article I).
306. See id. at 2210 (stating that the historical record of the Act is a constitutional
abrogation based on the Fourteenth Amendment).
307. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
308. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207 (finding that “Congress identified no
pattern of patent infringement by the States”).
309. See id.
310. See id. at 2208 (stating that the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest by a state is not itself unconstitutional in procedural due process claims).
311. See id. (holding that a patent infringement is unconstitutional if a state
provides inadequate remedies for injured patent owners or no remedies at all).
312. See id. at 2209 (noting Congress’ failure to make the required findings).
313. Id. at 2210 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
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that the provisions of the Act are out of proportion to the remedial
objective.314 Congress lifted the immunity of all states for all kinds of
patent infringements.315 The Court faulted Congress for failing to
limit the abrogation to instances in which the state refuses to provide
a state remedy, or to instances of intentional infringement.316
Although the Florida Prepaid decision is consistent with the Court’s
trend to favor states’ rights, the opinion, nevertheless, is curious.317
Most interesting perhaps is the Court’s reliance on the test
announced in Flores, a case that presented a very different kind of
issue.318 That case involved a statute in which Congress attempted to
use its section 5 powers to change the substantive meaning of the
First Amendment and to overrule the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution.319 By contrast, the Patent Remedy Act did not attempt
to redefine the substantive scope of any constitutional provision.320
Instead, as the dissenters noted, it “was passed to prevent future
violations of due process, based on the substantiated fear that States
would be unable or unwilling to provide adequate remedies for their
own violation of patent-holders’ rights.”321 In short, it was a purely
remedial measure.322
The majority’s method to resolve the issue in Florida Prepaid is a
greater threat to Congress’ remedial powers under section 5 than the
holding itself. In the past, the Court chose to defer to reasonable
congressional judgments regarding the exercise of section 5 power.323
314. See id. (stating that the disproportionality prevents an understanding of how
the statute is responsive to the unconstitutional behavior).
315. See id. at 2203 (stating that Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to clarify
the intent to subject states to patent infringement suits).
316. See id. at 2210.
317. See, e.g., id. at 2219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s
“expansive and judicially crafted protection of States’ rights”). See generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Lopez
and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213 (1996) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s activism which seeks to protect states’ rights).
318. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
319. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (stating that
Congress’ disagreement with the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment
resulted in the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) of
1993).
320. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that
the Act had no impact on substantive state law).
321. Id. at 2217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contrasting the Patent Remedy Act from
the RFRA, which attempted to overrule the Court’s interpretation of the First
Amendment).
322. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Patent Remedy Act was passed
out of concern that States would be unwilling or unable to provide adequate
remedies for its own violations).
323. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress
may permit private suits against states when it acts pursuant to section 5 of the
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In sharp contrast, the approach in Florida Prepaid involves close
judicial scrutiny of the legislative record to find evidence that
Congress is remedying a “‘widespread and persisting deprivation of
constitutional rights.’”324 Additionally, the Court demands a showing
that the prophylactic measure is “genuinely necessary”325 to prevent a
Fourteenth Amendment violation.
This approach substantially
erodes Congress’ section 5 powers, including its power to abrogate
state immunity from suits for violations of federal law.326
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents327 illustrates the continued erosion of congressional power.
Relying on Flores and Florida Prepaid, the Court held that Congress
does not have power under section 5 to subject states to suit by
private individuals under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”).328 The legislative record included some evidence of age
discrimination by the states. Nevertheless, rather than defer to
congressional judgment, the Court independently assessed the
legislative history and concluded that the “legislative record confirms
that Congress’ 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.
Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the

Fourteenth Amendment); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134 (1970) (upholding
Congress’ power to control the election of federal officers); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (declaring that Congress’ power to pass legislation
under section 5 is broad and does not require the judiciary to make determinations
of constitutionality in every instance); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
308 (1966) (holding that the Voting Rights Act was a proper exercise of Congress’
power under section 5). See generally Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A
Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (analyzing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), which granted Congress broad power under section 5); Erwin
Chemerinksy, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601 (1998) (arguing that Flores was wrongly decided and that
Congress may use section 5 powers to expand rights); William Cohen, Congressional
Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975)
(examining the doctrine of dual federalism as a limit on Congress’ powers under
section 5).
324. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 526).
325. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219, 2225 (1999) (stating that Flores requires the Court to consider “whether the
prophylactic measure taken under purported authority of § 5 . . . was genuinely
necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
326. Lower courts have applied Flores to the immunity issue. See, e.g., Alsbrook v.
City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (following the
Flores reasoning to rule that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not
apply to the states); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698,
701 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Congress lacks power under section 5 to abrogate
state immunity from suits under the American with Disabilities Act).
327. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
328. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994).
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states, much less any discrimination “whatsoever that rose to the level
of constitutional violation.”329 Despite the ADEA’s unequivocal
language subjecting states to enforcement suits,330 the majority ruled
that Congress lacked power to abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity.331
In theory there may be ways to limit Alden’s impact, but as a
practical matter, the alternatives are unsatisfactory.332 Just as Seminole
restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to direct recovery from
states for violations of federal law,333 Alden restricts a person’s access to
state courts.334 The experience of the Maine parole and probation
officers reveals that the two decisions combine to hinder the ability of
injured parties to secure state compliance with federal law.335 In the
name of federalism, these developments create an “enforcement
gap”336 with respect to a wide range of federal laws that apply to the
states.337
329. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648-49.
330. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994) (defining employers subject to enforcement
as including “a state or political subdivision of a State and any agency or
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State”).
331. The Court observed that the decision does not “signal the end of the
line. . . .” Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650 (listing state age discrimination statutes), for victims
of age discrimination by states. State employees may rely on state law where
available. See id. at 650.
332. Congress might attempt to use its spending powers to condition the receipt
of federal funds on a waiver of state immunity. See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason
Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 557 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding Congress may condition state’s
receipt of Title IX funds on waiver of immunity). See generally South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (discussing how Congress may attach conditions on states’
receipt of federal funds).
333. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S 44, 76 (1996).
334. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 754 (1999) (holding that states retain their
immunity from private suit in state courts).
335. See id. at 809 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Alden and Seminole Tribe
have created a “total barrier” to individual enforcement of FLSA).
336. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219, 2235 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that an exemption for states
from a substantive regulatory program and a related system of private remedies
would threaten the enforcement of a program created by Congress).
337. Congress has abrogated state immunity in a number of statutes. See, e.g.,
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994) (indicating that a
state shall not be immune from an action for a violation of the Act); Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994) (indicating that sovereign immunity
has been waived); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994) (stating that a state is not
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); Education of Individuals with
Disabilities, 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (1994) (establishing the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity); Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)
(1994) (stating that governments and government agencies are “persons” who can be
sued as “employers” for unlawful discrimination); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a) (1994) (stating that “any person” is liable for presenting a fraudulent claim
to the government); Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(4),
2617(a)(2) (1994) (permitting an action for damages against a public agency); Plant
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CONCLUSION
Federalism is the thread that draws together the Younger doctrine,
the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and the Alden decision. It is
worthwhile to recall that “federalism” is not an end but rather a
means to allocate governmental power between the national
government and the states. This process is thought to serve a
number of values.338 First, some argue that federalism prevents
tyranny by bringing power in certain instances closer to the people.339
Second, individual liberty might be better protected by the separation
of power between the national government and the states.340 Third,
the division of power may enhance governmental efficiency and
effectiveness.341 Finally, a federal system encourages local innovation,
allowing a state to serve as a “laboratory”342 for experiments in social
and economic policies.
Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 2570 (1994) (declaring that states shall be
liable for infringement of plant variety protection provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d7(a)(1) (providing that no state would be immune from suit for a violation of federal
statutes prohibiting discrimination).
The Court has agreed to decide whether Congress has power to abrogate
immunity in qui tam actions under the False Claims Act. See Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (considering whether a state may be subject to suit
under the False Claims Act).
338. See, e.g., BRAVEMAN, supra note 226, at 194-95 (examining arguments that
claim federalism promotes values such as keeping government close to the people,
individual liberty, and government effectiveness); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of
Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1248-49 (1994) (arguing
that federalism can reduce the risk of abuse by the state or federal government);
James Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Contemporary and Competing Paradigms, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1994) (asserting that federalism serves the goal of
encouraging and facilitating “geographically-based political autonomy”); Richard
Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994) (considering the purported values of
federalism such as “increasing opportunities for political participation, keeping
government close to the people, intergovernmental competition and representation
of diverse interests”); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389405 (1997) (providing a catalogue of the values of federalism); Deborah Jones
Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1563, 1573-75 (1994) (assessing the values promoted by the autonomy model of
federalism).
339. See BRAVEMAN, supra note 226, at 194-95; Briffault, supra note 338, at 1305.
340. See BRAVEMAN, supra note 226, at 194-95; Amar, supra note 338, at 1249
(claiming that a federalist system allows a citizen to use either the federal or state
government if the other invades the citizen’s constitutional rights).
341. BRAVEMAN, supra note 226, at 194-95 (stating that one reason for the
establishment of separation of powers in the constitution was efficiency).
342. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that states must have the power to experiment to address social
and economic problems); Friedman, supra note 338, at 397 (discussing the idea that
states can be laboratories for experimentation); Merritt, supra note 338, at 1575
(indicating that “states offer the laboratories for social experimentation”).
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Unfortunately, Alden, like its federalism companions, fails to
explain how those federalism values are threatened by the exercise of
jurisdiction against the states. Indeed, the cases limiting the state and
federal judiciary’s roles lack any meaningful discussion of the ways in
which the exercise of jurisdiction would disserve the purposes of our
federal structure. Rather, the Court refers to “federalism” as if the
reference itself conveys all one needs to know.343 Moreover, the Court
disregards the national interests that support the congressional
determination to subject states to federal requirements and
compliance lawsuits. In short, the Court seems to lose sight of the
proposition that “our federalism” recognizes the legitimate interests
of both the national and state governments.
Taken together, Alden, Younger, and the current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence prevent the implementation of national
policies by restricting individuals in their ability to force the states to
comply with federal law. Judge Gibbons’ conclusion regarding the
earlier use of federalism to close the federal courts is equally
applicable here: “One suspects that at the core of this philosophy is
nostalgia for a return to an earlier era; a conviction that by restricting
the reach of national law the Court can insulate the status quo; that if
matters were left to the states, people and institutions would again
know their places.”344 It is not surprising that this willingness to
restrict enforcement of national policy against the states reminds
some345 of the discredited Lochner346 doctrine. The similarity to
Lochner is twofold: first, these cases “deprive Congress of necessary
flexibility”347 to address national problems; and second, they assume
for the Court the responsibility to draw the proper lines of
authority.348
In this regard, Justice Breyer observed that one of the important
343. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (referring to “our federalism” as a concept which
requires Congress to treat the States as “residuary sovereigns”).
344. Gibbons, supra note 62, at 1117.
345. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2238 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (drawing an analogy
between the majority’s decision and Lochner).
346. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (holding that a New York
statute limiting the number of hours an individual may work violated a person’s
freedom to contract).
347. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2238 (stating that the court’s theory of
sovereign immunity set forth in Seminole Tribe is similar to Lochner in that Congress
will be restricted from creating remedies critical to the nation’s advancement toward
the future).
348. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(comparing the majority’s decision to the Court’s “Lochner era’s industrial due
process”).
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goals of a federalist structure is the protection of liberty by
“promoting the sharing among citizens of governmental
decisionmaking authority.”349
To protect this kind of liberty,
legislative flexibility is necessary to determine the proper allocation of
power between the central and the state governments.350 Many of the
modern problems, such as matters relating to commerce and
technology, involve national and global issues but at the same time
directly affect the daily lives of citizens.351 To resolve these problems,
a balance must be found that preserves some local control but avoids
a “regulatory ‘race to the bottom’”352 on issues with national and
international implications. This balance, Justice Breyer noted, is
highly context specific and cannot be struck easily by courts.353 Justice
Breyer concluded that “the modern substantive federalist problem
demands a flexible, context-specific legislative response (and it does
not help to constitutionalize an ahistoric view of sovereign immunity
that, by freezing its remedial limitations, tends to place the State
beyond the reach of law).”354
With Alden, the federalism pendulum has swung fully in the
direction of states’ rights. By elevating sovereign immunity in state
court to a constitutional doctrine, the Court has taken another step
toward insulating states from liability for federal law violations. Like
previous applications of federalism that limited judicial enforcement,
the current approach is anachronistic and ill-designed to protect
national interests.

349. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2239.
350. See id. (explaining the need for legislative flexibility in order to protect
liberty).
351. See id.
352. Id. (describing the need for a balancing of interests by the courts when
considering national issues that also implicate local interests).
353. See id. (describing the judiciary’s limitations in maintaining the “proper
local/national/international balance”).
354. Id.

